1. The world is a dangerous place to live — not because of the people who are evil but because of the people who don't do anything about it. — Albert Einstein

2. The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it. — George Orwell

3. History teaches that war begins when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. — Ronald Reagan

4. The terror most people are concerned with is the IRS. — Malcolm Forbes

5. There is nothing so incompetent, ineffective, arrogant, expensive, and wasteful as an unreasonable, unaccountable, and unrepentant government monopoly. — A Patriot

6. Visualize World Peace — Through Firepower!

7. Nothing says sincerity like a Carrier Strike Group and a U.S. Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

8. One cannot be reasoned out of a position that he has not first been reasoned into.

2010-11-16

Jeremy Grantham on the Federal Reserve Board

Full Transcript: Jeremy Grantham Interview

JEREMY GRANTHAM BARTIROMO, LULU CHIANG, INVESTOR AGENDA, DAVOS, BLOG, CNBC, CNBC.COM, MARKETS, STOCKS, STOCK MARKET, STOCK MARKET NEWS, CNBC STOCK NEWS, CNBC MARKET NEWS,
Posted By: Lulu Chiang | CNBC Senior Producer

cnbc.com
| 11 Nov 2010 | 11:46 AM ET

Legendary investor Jeremy Grantham, Chief Investment Strategist of Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo sat down with Maria Bartiromo in an extremely rare interview.
Grantham recommended institutional clients to sell into this rally. He is convinced that stocks are overpriced and cash is now the avenue for investors.
As an investment strategist for the past 30-years, Grantham has long been known for his timely calls.
In 1982, he said U.S. market was ripe for a "major rally."
And in 1989, he correctly called the top of the Japanese economy. In January 2000, he warned of an impending crash in tech stocks which took place two months later. And in April 2007, Grantham said we are now seeing the first worldwide bubble in history covering all asset classes.
When we sat down with Mr. Grantham earlier this week, he expressed worries about various pockets of the global markets, including emerging markets and U.S. stocks. Grantham is betting on a strong cash position and being patient about when to get back into the market.
Check out the complete transcript of Maria Bartiromo’s interview with Jeremy Grantham, or watch the complete interview here.
MARIA BARTIROMO: Great to have you on the program. Thanks so much for joining us.
JEREMY GRANTHAM: Very nice to be here.
BARTIROMO: Time and time again, your writings and your predictions have been right on in terms of investing and where we are in this market. From the tech bubble to beyond. Can you talk to us about where we are today in the stock market and what trends you see developing?
GRANTHAM: What I worry about most is the Fed's activity and — QE2 is just the latest demonstration of this. The Fed has spent most of the last 15, 20 years— manipulating the stock market whenever they feel the economy needs a bit of a kick. I think they know very well that what they do has no direct effect on the economy.
The only weapon they have is the so-called wealth effect. If you can drive the market up 50 percent, people feel richer. They feel a little more confident, and the academics reckon they spent about three percent of that. So, the market went up 80 percent last year. They should be spending 2.4 percent extra of— of the entire value of the stock market, which is about two percent of GDP. And that's a real kicker.
You don't see it because of the enormous counterdrag from the housing market— and— and its complete bust. But, it would have been worse with— without this. The problem is, they know very well how to stimulate the market. But, for whatever reason, they step away as the market gathers steam, and— and resign any responsibility for moderating— a bull market that may get out of control as we saw in '98 and '99 with Alan Greenspan, as we saw in the housing market.
And— I fear that the market will continue to rise. It will be continuously speculative. After all, when you can borrow at a rate that is negative after adjustment for inflation, it's not surprising that you would borrow a lot.
BARTIROMO: So, what are the implications of— of this constant easing and stimulation? You know, it— it seems the numbers are so mind boggling: $600 billion here.
GRANTHAM: They— they (CHUCKLE) are mind-boggling.
BARTIROMO: You know? (CHUCKLE) But, give us the—
GRANTHAM: The consequences are you get boom and bust. You— stimulate in '91. You let it get out of control. You have this colossal tech bubble in '99. Sixty-five times earnings for the— for the growth stocks. Then you have an epic bust. Then, of course, they're panic struck. They race back into battle with immense stimulus with negative real rates for three years.
And you get another— rise of risk taking and everything risky— prospered in '03, '04, '05, '06, '07 until we had what I called the first truly global bubble. It was pretty well everywhere in everything. It was in real estate. Almost everywhere. It was in stocks absolutely everywhere. And— and it was in the bond market to some considerable degree.
And that, of course, broke. They all break. That's the one thing they can't control. You can drive a market higher and eventually — of its sheer overpricing, it will eventually pop. And, typically, it seems to pop at the most inconvenient time. So, we're going to drive this one up, and this time there isn't much ammunition. In 2000, the Fed had a good balance sheet. The government had a good balance sheet.
In '08, it was still semi respectable, and— and now it's not. It's not very respectable at all. So, what are they going to use as ammunition if they cause another bubble and it breaks, let's say, in a couple of years? Then we might have some real Japanese-type experiences.
BARTIROMO: Where are the solutions then, if not this? What do you think ought to be done?
GRANTHAM: I think the Fed is not designed— to have effective tools to deal with the economy. It should settle for just controlling the money supply. And— if it insists, it can worry about inflation. The way you address a weak economy, particularly very substantial excess unemployment is through fiscal policy. You must either bribe man— manufacturers, corporations to hire people who have been unemployed, which they did in Germany. A lot of economists think that's perfectly effective.
Or you must go in there and hire people yourself as a government. Now, I— I believe in crowding out. So, I— I would never do it unless there was clearly quite a few million extra unemployed. I wouldn't go after too many skilled labor because there's never— enough of them to go around. And that does cause crowding out. I would go after the— what I called lightly-skilled workers.
The kind of people who were building the extra million-dollar— sorry— extra million houses in— in '05, '06 and '07. And find— and find jobs for them. We have an infrastructure that is decades behind schedule.
We could insulate every house in the Northeast. These are high-return projects, great— for society in general. And to— to allow people to sit there unemployed. Their skills are deteriorating. Their family morale goes to hell. And— it's a deadweight on society. And you have to remember when— when the government hires someone, he doesn't pay the full price like a corporation does.
He pays about half price because he pays a lot. He, the government— it, the government, pays a lot for someone sitting down unemployed. All the— all the many ways— that unemployed get— get helped plus— the government carries the atrophying of the skills. Society loses that, the longer they're unemployed.
BARTIROMO: So, what should the federal government be doing then? I mean, the housing industry, for example, missing in action. What is it going to take to get housing moving again? What is it gonna take to get businesses hiring again? If it's not the job of the Federal Reserve, what policy should we be seeing coming out of the government?
GRANTHAM: I think the Federal Reserve has— is in a very strong position to move against bubbles. Bubbles are the most dangerous thing— asset-class bubbles that come along. They're the most dangerous to investors. They're also the most dangerous to the economies of— as we have seen in Japan and in 1929 and now here. You've got to stop them.
The Fed has enormous power to move markets. And it— not necessarily immediately, but give them a year and they could bury a bull market. They could have headed off the great tech bubble. They could have headed off the housing bubble. They have other responsibilities— powers. They— they could have interfered with the quantity and quality of the sub-prime event. They chose not to.
In fact, Greenspan led the charge to deregulate this, deregulate that, deregulate everything, which was most— ill advised, and for which we have paid an enormous price. So, they can— they can stop bubbles, and— and they should. It's easy. It's a huge service. What you do now is— is— I like to say it's a bit like the Irish problem.
I wouldn't start the journey from here if I were you when you ask— the way. You— you really shouldn't allow the— situation to get into this shape. You should not have allowed the bubbles to form and to break. Digging out from a great bubble that has broken is so much harder than preventing it in the first place.
Japan has paid 20 years for the price of the greatest land— bubble and the greatest stock bubble in history. Far worse, in my opinion, than the South Sea bubble or the tulip bubble in many ways. The land under the Emperor's Palace really was worth the whole state of California, which is quite remarkable. But, we spent quite a few hours checking it, and it seemed to be true. And the price they paid— to dig out of that has, of course, been legendary.
And we better hope that we don't pay anything like that price. But, that is a risk. It's not— it's not certain that we will escape— without several years of— sub-average growth and— and stress to the system.
BARTIROMO: So, are there policies that the administration could be implementing?
GRANTHAM: It's really Congress. If Congress is bound and determined to— interfere with any proposed stimulus, then— we’re going to have a nice experiment and that is to see how the natural, recuperative powers of the economy stand up to this stress. I think it will probably muddle through. But, it won't be pretty. I— I don't think it will necessarily go backwards. But, it will go forward at a very sub-average rate. And I think that's the course that— would have to be recommended now is— it would be much better if Congress would shape up and— and do some sensible— stimulus program from here.
And it would be sensible if the Fed recognized it doesn't have that— that power, and— and get out of the way. Cranking out the printing press irritates all the foreign countries. Why wouldn't it? It's manipulating the dollar downwards. It's causing inflationary fears.
It's causing— commodities to go through the roof. Not led by gold by the way. Gold has gone up almost exactly the same in the last year as all the other metals. Everything is up. The commodity index in a year is up 35 percent. A weighted average of everything. And that isn't oil because oil is slightly less than that.
But, it is— a very dangerous situation. And it risks currency wars. If we're seen to be pushing down the dollar, when on technical terms— and fundamental terms, I should say, the dollar looks already pretty cheap, and we're clearly driving it down by aiming to increase inflation and— and swamping the system with money, why wouldn't— emerging countries take defensive action? And all of them are.
So, we're already in— in a— in a currency war in a way. It's a mild one, and I hope it stays that way. But, a currency manipulation is exactly the same as tariffs. It's a bit easier to change, a bit easier to back off. But, it has the same effect on global economy if we get into a currency war as if we got into a tariff war, which characterized the period after 1930 when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill was passed. And— and— and they're talking about that even as we speak in— in— in Congress.
BARTIROMO: So, while so many people are talking about the Chinese as far as manipulating their currency, you say the Fed is manipulating these markets?
GRANTHAM: They are. And— and— and China is, of course, manipulating its currency. And it would make life easier for everybody if they would allow the currency to rise a— a little faster. But, it— it certainly weakens our hand enormously to go there and— and shout at them angrily when we're clearly doing the same thing. And this is what the— the German Finance Minister— the point he made two days ago.
BARTIROMO: Yeah. Let me ask you about emerging markets. You recommended an overweight position in emerging markets back in 2000 when not many people were talking about it. And, obviously, it was dead on, the right call as we've seen a huge move in the emerging markets. Do you think there's still room to run in the emerging markets? Or is that becoming a bubble?
GRANTHAM: Incidentally, the emerging market since— 2000 is 3.3 times the S&P. So, every $100 you have in the S&P, you would have had $330 starting from the same point in emerging. And after that incredible discrepancy, which by the way says the main event in investing should be getting the big picture right. It's nice to pick stocks. But, how many good stocks do you have to pick in a whole portfolio to equal that incredible move between the biggest asset class in the world, U.S. equities, and the third or fourth biggest asset class emerging markets?
It— it's these movements between the great asset classes that make you money. And I'm happy to say that that's the group that, GMO, I work with— asset allocation where we are students of bubbles. And— and— and, basically, financial history. It's a very entertaining job, I might say, which has made me forget the question.
BARTIROMO: The question is do you think that is now becoming overvalued? Is there still room to make money in emerging markets?
GRANTHAM: I'm pleased to say two and a half years ago, I did a quarterly letter called the Emerging Emerging Bubble, and I argued that in the following five years, the case for emerging would be seen as so crystal clear— that it could not possibly help but outperform and go to a premium PE. Now, up until then, they had always sold at a discount. Sometimes a substantial discount.
But, I — the case is this, they are growing at about six percent real. Six percent plus inflation. We are growing in the developed world at about two. Before '95, there was no difference. Before 1995. And now it's three to one. My argument two and a half years ago is what a simple bull case? You want to grow? Buy emerging.
You want to be conservative? Buy utility companies or the blue chips of— of— of the developed world. If you're going to grow at six, you're— you're— it is very appealing that you would outperform a world growing at two percent. And the developed world is slowing down. I— I say it has an incurable case of middle-aged spread.
It's just been there, done that. It's a little old. It's a little pastured. Doesn't have the population profile. Emerging does. And they have the attitude, and they have good finances. And— and they're really showing— a— a clean pair of heels to the developed world.
Now, it turns out that you— it's a bit more complicated. You don't actually find a strong correlation between— top-line GDP growth and making money in the market. It— it seems like you should. The fastest-growing countries should give you the highest return. They simply don't. But, there's only four of us— that— that believe that story. Everyone else in the world believes that if you grow fast like China, you'll outperform in the stock market.
And so, I'm reasoning two and a half years ago, everybody will think this way pretty soon. And surely— emerging countries will go to a big premium on— every dollar of earnings that they make. And they're beginning to. But, I think they've got at least a few years left. The bad news for us, because we're fairly purest value managers for mainly institutional clients, is we don't like to play games with overpriced assets.
And that's the world that we're in now. The Fed is driving the S&P, which is overpriced— the Standard & Poor's 500— a broad measure of the U.S. market, is driving it from already substantially overpriced into what I would call dangerously overpriced.
This is about the boundary line. We expect on a seven-year horizon one percent only plus inflation from the U.S. market. And now, as you push it up another 20 percent perhaps in the next year, it becomes dangerously overpriced. A bubble territory and ready to inflate to considerable pain. That's what we have to worry about.
So, you're caught between, if you want to become conservative, you've got to start taking— counteraction now. If— if you want to go with the flow, don't fight the Fed as they say— you should be prepared to speculate on very nimble feet. It's not our style as a firm. But, I think it's— probably a game that you could play with a pretty good chance of winning for— for a few more quarters.
BARTIROMO: A few more quarters. But, at some point— or is it today— would you be recommending selling into the rally?
GRANTHAM: Our institutional clients— sell very gracefully into this rally. We've already started to sell. We're not even— averagely weighted. We're modestly underweighted. And you must remember bonds are even worse than stocks on a seven-year forecast. So, you get caught in this paradox. It's very tempting— and this is what the Fed wants by the way.
It wants us to go out there and buy stocks, which are overpriced because bonds they have manipulated into being even less attractive. So, we’re being forced to choose between two overpriced assets. That is not always a terrific choice to make because there is a third choice, and that is don't play the game and hold money in cash.
And cash has a— a virtue that people don't appreciate fully. And that is its— its optionality. In other words, if anything crashes and burns in value— say the U.S. stock market, if you have no resources, it doesn't help you. If the bond market crashes, and you have no resources, it doesn't help you. And what cash is is an available resource. It buys you the right to buy the U.S. market if the S&P drops from 1,220 today to 900, which is what we think is fair value.
You then have some resources if you have some cash. There's another complexity and that is that we believe that the old-fashioned, super blue-chip franchise companies like Coca-Cola are also much cheaper than the rest of the market. So, if someone put a gun to my head and s— said, "I've got to buy stocks. What should I buy?" I'd say, "Buy two units of the Coca-Colas. They're the cheapest group in— in the equity world. Buttress it with a fairly large dose of emerging markets. They're a little overpriced. But, they've got potential. And— a lot more cash than normal for opportunities should the bubble blow up."
BARTIROMO: What about commodities? I mean, clearly, the story of China and the demand coming out of China has boosted all sorts of commodities. Is that bull run still in place?
GRANTHAM: I have an eccentric view on commodities not necessarily shared by my colleagues or by— almost anybody. And that is we're running out of everything. I think it will become devastatingly clear to everybody. I— I think we went through a great paradigm shift about five years ago and— we'd spent a 100 years with almost all commodities declining. Perhaps oil was about flat in real terms, adjusted for inflation.
But, everything else was declining: copper, corn, and so on. And, now, you look back five years later, you can't see that clearly at all. A lot of them seem like they've been going up for 50 years, a 100 years: copper— iron ore— tin. But— and— and— and oil. Oil has clearly broken out. It spent a 100 years at $16 in— in our currency until 1974. And then it doubled when OPEC started and it's been 20 years trading around 35, plus or minus a lot.
And then I think it doubled it again, and I think the trend line is probably about 75. So, the world has changed. We're entering a period where we're running out of everything. The growth rate of China and India is simply— can't be borne by declining quality of— of resources. And— and I think we're in a period that I call a chain-linked— crisis in commodities.
So, it'll be a crisis in rice. It will triple and it'll come down. But, then— then it'll be followed by one in corn and— and barley and so on. And— and copper will go up a lot, and then that will come down. But, oil will be in crisis mode. From now on, we just better get used to it. So, if you're afraid of inflation, I think— and if you can bring yourself to have a long horizon— and when I say long, I mean ten to 20 years, not the usual ten to 20 weeks— that locking up resources in the ground is a terrific idea.
Or locking up— timber, agricultural land will do just fine. A great inflation hedge. You will win, in my opinion. Very high probability over a long horizon. Now, have these things gotten ahead of themselves in the short term? Quite possibly yes. And that— that's what makes investing so tricky. If they were to break for whatever reason at all in the next year, I— I would suggest that is a great buying opportunity.
BARTIROMO: And—
GRANTHAM: To— to buy here is to trade off the long-term high prospects of winning with quite a reasonable chance of— of— of buying at a— a— a short-term peak.
BARTIROMO: So, is there value in some of the commodities producers? The equities
GRANTHAM: If they have stuff in the ground. If they're just processors, forget them. Shoot them, in fact. Because they're the people who will pay the price of constantly having to raise their prices paying more for their raw materials. But— if they've got stuff in the ground. The oil industry since 2000 has doubled against the stock market. They didn't double because they got brilliant.
They doubled because oil in the ground became worth four times what it was. And that is a wonderful thing for an oil company with good reserves. But, the same if you had mineral reserve. That— that's the play, I think, on commodities.
BARTIROMO: It's extraordinary that people are putting so much money into such low-yielding, fixed income— products. And— ignoring dividend payers, which of course in equities are— are even more competitive than— than the yields that you're seeing. You're seeing no yield in— in fixed income. Is that a bubble?
GRANTHAM: I— I don't call it a bubble because it's not— it's not driven by huge animal stir— spirits. They're not doing it to sell it at a huge profit. They're doing it because they were severely frightened— in the great crunch. It was a devastating event. And it could have c— turned out much worse than it did. It— it should have frightened people. It did frighten people and they'll still frightened for quite a while.
And what the Fed is trying to do is to make cash so ugly that it will force you to take it out and basically speculate. And in that, it's very successful, of course, with the hedge funds. They're out there speculating. Finally, the ordinary individuals are beginning to get so fed up with having no return on their cash that they're beginning to do a little bit more purchasing of equities. And that's what the Fed wants.
It wants to have the stocks go up, to make you feel a bit richer so that you'll spend a little more and give a short-term kick to the economy. But, it— it's a pretty circular argument. For every dollar of wealth effect you get here, as stocks go from overpriced to worse, you will give back in a year or two. And you'll give it back like it— like it happened in— in '08 at the very worse time.
All of the kicker that Greenspan had engineered for the '02, '03, '04 recovery and so on was all given back with interest. The market overcorrected through fair value. The housing market that was a huge driver of economic strength and a— actually masked structural unemployment with all those extra, unnecessary houses being built. All of that was given back similarly at the same time. It couldn't have been worse.
BARTIROMO: What are you expecting from the economy in 2011?
GRANTHAM: (Sigh.) I'm expecting 2011, 2012 to— and— and 20 as far as I can see to be less handsome than it used to be. I think we— we're on a trend lying growth of about two percent. And— I think we'll muddle through— quite well. The problem is in the not too distant future, stocks will be too expensive and they'll crack again. Risky, fixed-income will be too expensive and that will crack again.
And unless we're lucky, we will have yet another crisis without being able to lower the rates 'cause they'll still be low, without being able to issue too much moral hazard promises from the Fed because people will begin to find it pretty hollow. Cycle after cycle, the Fed is making basically— is flagging the same intention. Don't worry, guys. Speculate. We'll help you if something goes wrong. And each time something does go wrong and it gets more and more painful.
And, eventually, even— even— fairly unintelligent investors might get the point that this is not a good game to play indefinitely. I am impressed, however, how eager we have been to return to the game. We got a— a practically mortal blow, and, yet, everyone was back in there swinging last year. It wasn't just that the S&P went up 80, which I did call by the way. I said it would race up to 1,100. And— but, it was speculative so the— the junky part of the market went up 120 percent. This is a formidable— recognition of what the Fed can do when it wants to.
BARTIROMO: What about the dollar? Where do you see it?
GRANTHAM: The dollar is on fundamental purchasing power— it's a— a fairly cheap currency. And— as long as there's QE three, four, five and six, you'd have to bet that it's more probable that it will go down. Now, if it stirs up— a currency war, all bets are off. We haven't had one since the 1930s. We— who knows how that will play out? That's one thing that can completely change the game, and— and— very hard for me or anyone to guess what that would do.
But, if we avoid that, I think you have to count on the dollar being at least irregularly weaker until we finish the Q game, which is ma— basically just running a printing press and using it to push down artificially— the bond rate. And let me point out that the Fed's actions are taking money away from retirees.
They're the guys, and near retirees, who want to part their money on something safe as they near retirement. And they're offered minus after-inflation adjustment. There's no return at all. And where does that money go? It goes to relate the banks so that they're well capitalized again. Even though they were the people who exacerbated our problems.
And, hopefully, the redeeming feature in that infamous trade is that your corporations go out there, borrow money, build factories, hire people, which they're not doing because consumption is weak and because they were also terrified by the crunch. I— I think, therefore, under these conditions, low rates is actually hurting the economy. It's taking more money away from people who would have spent it —retirees — than are being spent by passing it on to financial enterprises and being distributed as bonuses to people who are rich and, therefore, save more.
So, I think it's a— a— bad idea at any time and a particularly bad idea now.
BARTIROMO: So, final question here. What are you recommending to institutional clients today? How— how should they be investing?
GRANTHAM: We recommend a very heavy overweight in— in the great franchise companies: the Coca-Cola’s , Johnson and Johnson's . I'm not recommending those two names. They're just examples. We're recommending a modest overweight in emerging, an underweight— in everything else. Extra cash reserves and— patience. But, I think if you're willing to speculate, you might find that this is an interesting one more year to speculate.
BARTIROMO: And—
GRANTHAM: But, be aware the ice is thin. It's overpriced. It's a dangerous game. Don't believe that it's somehow justified. It is not justified by anything except the crazy behavior of the Fed.
BARTIROMO: You said, "The ice is thin." In terms of these cracks, how significant a crack would you expect when, in fact, we do see a crack?
GRANTHAM: The trouble with bubbles is when they go, it's very hard to know how painful it will be. But, typically, they go racing back to fair value. So, if this market goes to 1,500 in a couple of years, by then, fair value might be at 950— 950 is painfully below 1,500. And by the time it gets there, the mysteries of momentum in— in the market— everyone likes to go in the same direction, and they shout, "Fire."
It— it's— usually the case that it doesn't stop at fair value— 950. So, it might go to 700. And— and you're talking another market that halves. It halved in 2000, and we thought it would by the way. We predicted a 50 percent decline. It halved this time in— in '08, '09. And I think it might very well halve again if it gets back to 1500.

Why ObamaCare Will NOT Work!

Newly-elected conservatives heading to Washington next year have a lot to do to curb the size of government and get federal deficits under control.  Requisite to achieving these goals is the full repeal of Obamacare.
According to Peter Orszag, former Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Obama, leaving the health law intact would create savings.  But this couldn’t be farther from reality.
Orszag claims that Obamacare will reduce the federal deficit and Medicare spending.  What isn’t mentioned is that, though it’s true that spending on Medicare will be reduced by $575 billion over the next decade, savings are used to offset spending on new programs.  So really, there are no savings at all.
Moreover, proponents of Obamacare expect the new law to reduce spending by cutting provider reimbursements and expanding bureaucracy through top-down delivery system changes aimed at increasing efficiency in the system.  In reality, the former will negatively affect seniors’ access to quality care, while the latter will be flat-out unsuccessful at reducing spending.
Obamacare reduces payment updates for hospitals and other providers under Medicare.  But rather than changing the value of the service provided, cutting how much Medicare pays does nothing but shift costs elsewhere.  When payments become too low, providers stop accepting Medicare patients altogether.
Medicare’s Chief Actuary reports that, “providers for whom Medicare constitutes a substantive portion of their business could find it difficult to remain profitable and, absent legislative intervention, might end their participation in the program (possibly jeopardizing access to care for beneficiaries).”
In light of these consequences, cuts to Medicare are unlikely to occur, especially if Congress’ perpetual delay of currently scheduled physician reimbursement cuts is any indicator.  Last summer, Congress delayed cuts to physicians payments for six months to avoid jeopardizing seniors’ access to care, and they will have to act again in the near future to again avoid this negative outcome.  If the cuts don’t occur, Obamacare would substantially increase the federal deficit
Obamacare also includes the creation of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, which Orszag describes as a “panel of independent experts who will look for more ways to improve Medicare’s cost-effectiveness.”  But the IPAB’s recommendations are strictly limited to implementing further detrimental cuts to provider payments.
The new health law also includes an attempt to create savings in Medicare by rooting out inefficiency.  Obamacare includes a pilot program to test accountable care organizations (ACOs), and the creation of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which will vet pilot programs and demonstration projects for widespread delivery system reform.  Just as the IPAB’s recommendations will automatically go into effect, the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will be able to implement chosen strategies nationwide without further action from Congress.
Not only do these changes represent a massive increase of power within the Medicare bureaucracy, but they are also likely to be ineffective.  Health policy and budget expert James Capretta writes that, “there is nearly half a century of experience with the Medicare program indicating that con fidence in ‘government-engineered’ efficiency improvement is entirely misplaced. Efforts to control costs from the top-down have always devolved into price setting and across-the-board payment-rate reductions, which is detrimental to the quality of American medicine. Price controls drive out willing suppliers of services, after which the only way to balance supply and demand is with waiting lists.”
The new law will be ineffective at increasing efficiency, instead succeeding only at creating further bureaucratic micromanagement of seniors’ care. The only way for the new Congress to eke out savings from health care is to repeal Obamacare and replace it with bottom-up, consumer-driven approach to reform.

2010-11-05

Why QE2 Won't -- and Can't -- Work!

Why QE2 Won't -- and Can't -- Work
Campbell Harvey
Fri, Nov 5, 2010

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- QE2, to put it simply, does not address the fundamental problems the U.S. economy faces. It is preposterous to think that reducing medium-term interest rates by 25 to 50 basis points is going to lead to a significant increase in gross domestic product and a reduction in unemployment.

The package

After much anticipation, the Federal Reserve unveiled a second round of quantitative easing (QE2), or bond buying, two days ago. It wasn't a surprise. Market participants had expected $500 billion to $700 billion of bond purchases, and the Fed announced $600 billion. The purchases will happen on a regular basis through June 2011.

It works in the following way: The Fed will be in the market buying Treasury bonds mainly in the 5- to 10-year range. The $600 billion size means the Fed will be effectively buying most of the newly issued Treasury debt in this maturity range. This is in addition to the purchases being made with the income and maturing bonds from the first round of QE. That increases the amount of buying to about $800 billion.

The Treasury needs to issue debt to finance the sprawling fiscal deficit. The Fed buys the debt. It is added to the balance sheet as both an asset and a liability. In the end, the Fed's balance sheet will grow to a staggering $3 trillion, which is 20% of GDP. That puts the U.S. in an exclusive club -- second only to the 23% held by a country with a disastrous monetary-policy record: Japan.

The logic

Fed buying will increase the price of the bonds. Increased prices will reduce interest rates. There will be an indirect effect on other securities, such as corporate bonds and mortgage-backed bonds. Given that the Fed is buying such a large proportion of new issues, it is hoped that other fixed-income investors will shift some of their demand to mortgages and corporate bonds. This will increase prices and reduce interest rates. This will make corporate financing cheaper and presumably drive down the mortgage rate.

There is a secondary effect. As U.S. interest rates go down, the U.S. is presumably less attractive for foreign fixed-income investors. This may put downward pressure on the exchange rate. A cheaper exchange rate means exports are more competitive and imports are more expensive.

Of course, the Fed has to do something. Its mandate includes price stability and full employment.

The flaws

1. Throwing stones, not shooting bullets

In the first round of quantitative easing, the Fed used bullets. There were many innovative programs that addressed the financial crisis. Short-term interest rates were dramatically driven to zero. The short-term interest-rate tool is not available anymore because interest rates can't go negative. Hence, other types of ammo are being used -- and this ammo is far less effective.

2. Impact on rates will be trivial

Some of my colleagues have written a paper on the impact of a $500 billion QE. It is available here. The impact is likely in the range of 25 to 50 basis points. Some of the impact is already incorporated into the bond prices because the size of the QE was highly anticipated. It is really unlikely that 25-50bp in medium-term interest rate yield reduction will have a sizable impact.

3. This will not revive the housing market

So what if mortgage rates are reduced by 25 basis points. Will this breathe life into the housing market? Very unlikely. Rates are already cheap. People don't want to buy a house because they know that there is both a huge inventory of unsold houses today and another wave of shadow inventory coming in the future as foreclosures continue. The risk of housing prices going down further is massively more important than a mortgage that is 25 basis points cheaper. Furthermore, there is a huge number of consumers who cannot refinance and take advantage of cheaper rates because they owe more on their mortgage than their house is worth. That was true before QE2 and after.

4. Consumers will not increase spending

It is possible that there is a trickle-down effect, whereby consumer credit rates are reduced a bit. Again, consumers are worried about the decreased value of their housing stock, their ability to hold on to a job and, eventually, building up their savings. This is not the time to go on a consumption binge.

5. Corporate cash is already out there

U.S. firms are sitting on $1.5 trillion in cash. The Duke-CFO survey showed that these firms are unwilling to deploy the cash because of: 1) uncertainty in the economy; and 2) they were afraid that their usual method of financing (through banks) might dry up in a second leg of the credit crisis. QE2 does not address either of these problems.

6. QE2 does not fix the problem with financial institutions

While some corporations are sitting on cash, there are many corporations that need financing for quality projects -- yet they cannot get this financing. The Duke-CFO survey showed that for small and medium-sized businesses, credit conditions deteriorated for more than one third of them -- compared to 2009. These firms have projects that they deem high quality that will help economic output and increase employment, yet they are refused financing. Why?

Right now, there are many banks that are in survival mode. There are more than 400 banks on the FDIC watch list and many more that should be on the watch list. In my opinion, the best way to get the financial system back to healthy condition is to purge these weak and often zombie banks. Their quality asset would be assumed by strong banks making them stronger. The FDIC would have to unwind all the garbage. Everyone knows that small and medium-sized businesses are the drivers of growth and employment. Why is it that so little attention is paid to the fact that they are still in credit-crisis mode?

7. The dollar is unlikely to fall that much

Yes, it is true that lower interest rates would usually put downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. Indeed, the trade-weighted dollar has already declined. However, there are some countervailing forces. First, the U.S. is still the safest place to invest. Europe is not very attractive and few want to touch Japan. Second, there could be action by other countries that could mute the effect on the exchange rate. Third, the reduction in rates is so small that I seriously doubt the effect on the dollar would be meaningful.

8. Fine-tuning rarely works

In 2003, interest rates were driven to 1% (which was a huge negative real interest rate) by the Fed because employment was slow to come around after the end of the 2001 recession. We all know what disastrous consequences this policy of not just cheap -- but subsidized -- borrowing caused. Financial institutions levered up with the subsidized funding. Consumers did mortgage-equity withdrawals as they refinanced at below-market rates. Housing prices went crazy. I think that most economists would agree that the Fed has much more power over inflation than employment. Yet part of its mandate is full employment. The latest policy is aimed at employment (though cloaked with concern about inflation being too low). It is best for the Fed to focus on inflation.

The good news

The good news is that the Fed is only doing $600 billion in QE. It could have been worse -- like $1 trillion.

What we should be doing

I have long been an advocate of short-term pain to build the foundation for longer-term gain. Right now, we are treating symptoms rather than the underlying problems.

Get corporate credit flowing again

The only way to do this is to do a painful purge of our financial system. There could be 1,000 banks that need to go down. We need to end the "extend and pretend." We need to shutter the weak and reallocate their good assets to the strong -- to make them stronger. The bad assets would be unwound over a number of years by the FDIC. This would make our financial system much more secure and increase the chance that quality projects get funded. This, in turn, leads to higher growth and higher employment. We have twiddled our thumbs for three years making only incremental changes. We have very little to show. Our financial system is still broken. Well, let's try to fix it -- and lowering medium-term interest rates by 25bp does not fix it.

Purge the housing inventory

While it is painful, foreclosures must increase. It does not make sense that people who have not paid any mortgage payments since 2007 are still in their (or the bank's) house. Yes, I know that some were misled by banks -- and hopefully changes in lending practices will reduce the chance of this happening again. Yet many others brazenly did mortgage-equity withdrawals (increasing their debt) thinking that housing prices would continue to rise. Houses are just like any asset. They are risky. The risky bet did not pay off. The overhang of all the future foreclosures is paralyzing the housing market. Better to get it over with.

Put our fiscal house in order

This is not some sort of U.S. political endorsement -- unless you think German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a Tea Partier. Do you notice the divergence of approaches between the U.S. and Europe? Europe is going into austerity mode. There is very limited new QE in Europe.

The main problem we face is economic uncertainty. Much of that uncertainty is driven by the massive imbalances. There are two big ones. First, the U.S. government's fiscal deficit is running on an unsustainable course. Bold, bipartisan action is needed to put our house in order. Second, there are staggering unfunded liabilities in terms of Social Security, Medicare and government pension plans. The net present value of these liabilities is many times GDP. This is not sustainable and policies must be changed.

Given there is little political will to make tough choices that are good for the long run but painful in the short run, we are stuck.

Anyway, how do you explain world stock markets rising after the QE2 announcement? There will be some sober second thoughts. After all, QE2 does not address the fundamental problems.